Ethereum Classic Community Call #57
10 Years of Classic
Key Points Discussed
- The call marked ten years of Ethereum Classic and the Fifthening: block 25,000,001 was mined on 22 July 2026, cutting the reward from 2.048 to 1.6384 ETC under ECIP-1017, two days after the 10-year anniversary of the DAO fork.
- Diego presented his article The Timeline That Kept the Money: the DAO attacker is still the #7 ETC holder and has never moved the roughly 20% of stolen funds sitting on the ETC chain, while about 1.28 million ETC remains unclaimed in the White Hat Group’s refund contract.
- Of the roughly 11 million ETH stolen in 2016, about 8.4 million (over 70%) was recovered; the group’s refund contract is governed by a five-key multisig with four signers still active in the past year, and almost 1,500 recipient addresses have never transacted on either chain.
- Istora argued the DAO hard fork was unnecessary in hindsight, since a partial recovery plus the ongoing cat-and-mouse pursuit of the attacker would likely have returned most or all of the funds without splitting the chain, though the split did create ETC.
- Diego shared a cross-client benchmark built on offline Era1 re-execution: Geth Classic validated the full chain fastest (about 1.5 days), ahead of core-geth (~2 days), Nethermind (~3 days), and Besu (~5 days), and he judged all four clients to be at a comparable level of maturity.
- On post-quantum security, the group noted that ETC addresses are hashes of public keys, so only addresses that have already transacted (and thereby exposed a key) are exposed; a migration path is undecided, and Istora plans to focus on it at DEVCON Mumbai.
Full AI Summary and Transcript ↓
Preamble
Hello, and Welcome!
This community call is an open voice chat discussion about Ethereum Classic. Everyone is welcome.
The call will be published on YouTube. We kindly ask that discussion stays focused on ideas rather than individuals. Let’s keep it classy.
Find past episodes, transcripts, subscribe to calendar, and more at https://cc.ethereumclassic.org.
Introductions
Quick round of introductions for everyone on the call, and if there’s anything you want to talk about.
Announcements
The Fifthening has happened. At block 25,000,001, mined on 22 July 2026 at 17:13 UTC, the ETC block reward reduced by 20% from 2.048 ETC to 1.6384 ETC, per the 5M20 monetary policy set out in ECIP-1017. This is the fifth era reduction since the policy activated in 2017.
Today’s Agenda
This episode celebrates ten years of Ethereum Classic. On 20 July 2016, the DAO hard fork split the chain, and the network that kept the original ledger became ETC. A decade on, we look back at The DAO Hack that started it all.
- 10 Years of Classic: reflecting on The DAO Hack
- What actually happened in June and July 2016, and how do participants on the call remember it?
- Was “code is law” a founding principle or a label applied after the fact? The founding documents bracket the fork itself:
- A Crypto-Decentralist Manifesto, published 11 July 2016, nine days before the fork
- The Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence, published 13 August 2016, about three weeks after the fork
- What lessons from the fork still apply to how ETC handles contentious decisions today?
- Article discussion: The Timeline That Kept the Money: A DAO Hack Field Trip on Ethereum Classic by Diego
- The refund contract still holds roughly 1.28M unclaimed ETC, and the attacker’s addresses hold roughly 3.36M ETC, untouched for a decade
- Should anything be done about the unclaimed refund pool, or is leaving it alone the point?
- Why might the attacker’s funds have never moved? What would it mean for ETC if they did?
- Does the frozen DAO money strengthen or complicate the immutability narrative ten years on?
AI Summary
Recorded on Ethereum Classic’s tenth anniversary week and two days after the Fifthening block-reward reduction, Call 57 brought Istora together with Diego and Lunar to reflect on the 2016 DAO hack that gave rise to ETC. The discussion centered on Diego’s new article about the DAO refund contract and the funds still sitting untouched on the ETC chain, then moved through ETC’s funding transition, a cross-client performance benchmark of the four ETC clients, and an exploration of how post-quantum cryptography might affect the chain. Lunar left partway through, and the second half was a wide-ranging conversation between Istora and Diego on client tooling, NixOS, and quantum resistance.
Welcome: 10 Years of ETC and the Fifthening
Istora opened by marking two milestones landing in the same week.
- Details
- Istora: The call fell ten years after Ethereum’s mainnet hard forked following the DAO incident, the moment the unforked chain continued as Ethereum Classic
- Istora: The network also passed the Fifthening at block 25,000,001, mined on 22 July, reducing the block reward under the 5M20 schedule (ECIP-1017) and coinciding two days after the fork’s 10-year anniversary
- Istora: Welcomed Lunar and Diego, framing the episode as a chance to reflect on what happened a decade ago
- Conclusion
- The anniversary and the Fifthening set up a retrospective on the DAO hack and the fork that created ETC
The DAO Refund Contract: Diego’s Article
Diego walked through the research behind his article on where the DAO funds ended up.
- Details
- Diego: He began after noticing that the #7 holder of ETC is the address that hacked the original DAO, then studied the contract set up to return tokens to the original DAO holders (The Timeline That Kept the Money)
- Diego: Part of the funds were returned, but a substantial amount is still waiting to be claimed, and most non-claiming accounts are inactive on both ETC and Ethereum, raising the question of whether those holders will ever return
- Diego: About 20% of the stolen funds remain in the attacker’s control on ETC and have never been moved, which is why that address is still the #7 holder
- Istora: Of roughly 11 million ETH stolen in 2016, about 8.4 million (over 70%) was recovered, and roughly 1.28 million ETC remains unclaimed in the White Hat Group’s recovery contract
- Conclusion
- A decade on, both the attacker’s stake and a large unclaimed pool sit frozen on the ETC chain, controlled respectively by the attacker and the White Hat Group
The White Hat Group and the 2016 Fork
The conversation turned to the rescue group and whether the fork was the right call.
- Details
- Istora: The vast majority of recovered ETC sat in the White Hat Group recovery contract rather than being spent on Ethereum development, correcting a common assumption about Ethereum Foundation ETC sales
- Istora: He argued the DAO hard fork was unnecessary in hindsight, since accepting a partial haircut still returned over 70%, and continuing to pursue the attacker would likely have recovered close to 100% as the attacker was eventually unmasked
- Istora: The roughly 1.28 million ETC that was never fully claimed is controlled entirely by the White Hat Group, which could in principle sell it or use it to fund ETC development
- Diego: Confirmed the analysis and noted the striking fact that the stolen funds on ETC simply never moved
- Conclusion
- Both saw the fork as a mistake for Ethereum that nonetheless created ETC, leaving two parties (the attacker and the White Hat Group) sitting on large, untouched holdings
ETC Funding and Organizations Sunsetting
Prompted by Lunar, the group discussed who funds ETC development now.
- Details
- Istora: There are funding solutions in the works to be announced this year, and ETC does not need to tax miners (as in Olympia) to pay for development
- Istora: ETC is in a transition phase as the ETC Cooperative winds down, with something expected to replace it
- Lunar: Offered to act as a financial backstop for continued development if nothing else materializes, and asked how many people work on the clients
- Diego: Confirmed he is effectively the sole client developer at present, having not been contacted by many others, though he hopes more core developers will join
- Conclusion
- Funding is mid-transition with announcements expected this year, and Lunar volunteered to backstop client work that currently rests largely on Diego
Reflections: Could the Funds Be Reached?
Before leaving, Lunar pressed on the article’s thesis and whether the dormant funds could ever be recovered.
- Details
- Diego: The analysis used Blockscout for most of the on-chain work and an archive node only to check balances frozen at the time of the fork; almost 1,500 addresses have never sent a transaction on either chain, and about 80% of non-claimers have been dormant for five years or more
- Diego: The White Hat Group is still active, holding the refund contract through a multisig whose four of five signers were active in the past year
- Lunar: Said he had previously tried to reach the supposed DAO attacker without success, and raised the ethical and legal question of whether the funds could be used, to which Istora replied that under “code is law” the contract executed faithfully, though other jurisdictions might view the funds as stolen
- Istora and Diego: Noted the attacker donated around 10,000 ETC to a Community Fund multisig near the fork that was never used, that exchanges have likely blacklisted the address, and that the White Hat Group took roughly 1% of recovered funds (around 89,000 ETC) as a reward
- Conclusion
- The dormant funds are visible and analyzable but likely unreachable, and even the White Hat Group’s willingness to use unclaimed ETC is uncertain
Client Benchmarks, Era1, and Diversity
Diego presented testing infrastructure he built to keep the ETC clients in consensus and compare them.
- Details
- Diego: He continuously uploads every block and transaction to an S3 bucket in the Era1 format, then re-executes the whole chain offline from disk to validate clients without syncing from scratch
- Diego: Full-chain validation timings were about 1.5 days for Geth Classic (fastest), a bit over 2 days for core-geth, over 3 days for Nethermind, and over 5 days for Besu, largely reflecting Geth Classic’s default path-based database versus hash-based schemes
- Diego: The work surfaced fixes fed back into the clients, including a flag to force proof-of-work verification on Nethermind’s Era1 import (which skips it by default, an optimization aimed at proof-of-stake), and a fix for the system allocator not returning RAM to the OS fast enough during long Nethermind runs
- Diego: He judged all four clients to be at a comparable level of maturity, added ETH getWork and submitWork support across clients so miners could build blocks on any of them, and outlined next steps of scripted DevNets and transaction fuzzing (using Marius’s go-ethereum tool) for upcoming hard forks, all managed with NixOS
- Istora and Diego: Praised Nix for reproducibility and composability, agreeing that LLMs remove much of its learning curve
- Conclusion
- The four ETC clients now benchmark and interoperate at a similar maturity level, with Geth Classic a standout on performance, and NixOS-based tooling positioned to support future fork testing
Post-Quantum Security for ETC
With a few minutes left, Istora raised how quantum computing might affect ETC.
- Details
- Diego: ETC addresses are hashes of public keys and cannot be attacked on a quantum computer by the address alone, but once an address has made a transaction it exposes its public key through the signature and becomes potentially vulnerable
- Istora: Addresses that have never transacted are therefore safe, while those that have would need to migrate to a new scheme; a migration path is not yet decided
- Diego: Ethereum has post-quantum working groups meeting weekly at pq.ethereum.org; NIST-standardized signature algorithms such as Falcon, Dilithium, and MAYO could be added as primitives to let users move funds behind quantum-safe multisigs ahead of any threat
- Istora and Diego: Discussed whether migration could be automatic or piggyback on a normal transaction (as replay protection did at the ETC/Ethereum split), and Diego floated accounts that only accept transfers from post-quantum-secured senders to nudge migration; Istora said this would be his focus at DEVCON Mumbai and that ETC likely has more time than Bitcoin given its lower value as a target
- Conclusion
- Quantum resistance was framed as a challenge for ETC’s next decade that is less urgent than for Bitcoin but worth engaging early, with the Ethereum working groups as the natural starting point
Action Items
- Community: Read Diego’s article The Timeline That Kept the Money and comment or share feedback
- Community: Follow and engage with the Ethereum post-quantum working groups at pq.ethereum.org, relevant to ETC as well
- Diego: Release the NixOS configs and Era1 re-execution scripts so others can reproduce the cross-client benchmarks, and set up scripted DevNets with transaction fuzzing for upcoming hard forks
- Anyone interested in backstopping ETC development funding: reach out and join a future community call